



Grand Banks Gas for Power Generation in Newfoundland

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SSPE – Student Society of Petroleum Engineers

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Society of Petroleum Engineers



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
1. - Island Electrical Energy Options
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5. - Producers Costs and Incentives
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Electrical Energy Picture

Newfoundland has an insular grid w/
approx 2000 MW installed capacity.
Approx 500 MW thermal at Holyrood,
hydraulic elsewhere and small
thermal plants in isolated areas.

Upper Churchill capacity near
5400MW and the proposed Lower
Churchill capacity is around 2000MW.



LEGEND

● Generating Station	■ Terminal Station	▲ Diesel Plant
Transmission Lines		
— 735-kV	— 138-kV	— Low Voltage
— 230-kV	— 69-kV	- - - Customer-Owned

2005 GROSS ISLAND INTERCONNECTED ENERGY SUPPLY

Gigawatt hours (GWh)

Hydraulic Generation		Power Purchases	423
Bay D'Espoir	2,847	Percentage of Total	
Cat Arm	684	Energy Supply	6%
Upper Salmon	590		
Hinds Lake	376	Thermal Generation	
Granite Canal	243	Holyrood	1,414
Paradise River	39	Gas Turbine and Diesel	2
Mini Hydro	7		1,416
	4,786	Percentage of Total	
Percentage of Total		Energy Supply	21%
Energy Supply	72%		



Island Energy Planning

Demand growth, grid stability/security and industrial marketing strategies require enhanced on-island grid capacity soon.

Kyoto compliance, tax benefits, supply security and cost of energy to the consumer are other key factors of immediate concern.

Depreciation of existing thermal facilities is high.



New Island Electrical Capacity Options


1. Oil-based thermal.
2. HVDC Hydro infeed from Labrador.
3. On-Island Hydro procurement.
4. Wind power.
5. Nuclear fission.
6. Natural Gas-based thermal.



1 - Oil-fired generation



Oil based thermal presently provides the Island with seasonal power capacity. The primary facility at Holyrood is ageing, our dependence upon foreign oil (No. 6 fuel, 2.2% sulfur) has never been greater, the pressures to decrease greenhouse gas emissions and pollutants are increasing and the cost advantage of oil vs. other energy sources is dwindling.





NOTES:

Holyrood was placed in service in 1970 with two 150 MW units. A third 150 MW unit was added in 1980 to increase the output to 450 MW. In 1988/89 the original two units were modified to increase the plant capacity to 490 MW

Estimated Service life Holyrood thermal plant 25 to 30 years

Annually the plant generates 3000 GWh of energy which can be up to 40 percent of the Islands energy requirements.

The plant burns No. 6 residual fuel oil at the rate of approximately 6,000 barrels per day, or 2 million barrels per year. This amount of fuel is equivalent to the amount of fuel to run 200,000 cars over 15,000 km each (about every drop of gas in Newfoundland) – but the fuel oil is much dirtier.


We pay between \$80 and \$100 million per year for the fuel at Holyrood depending on demand and rainfall. We have not begun to pay for the recent jump in oil costs above \$39/barrel. A switch to cleaner fuel from 2% to 1% sulfur will add 10% more to this cost.

Source: NL Hydro Annual report 2005



2 - Labrador Hydro Power

Sell Labrador hydro power at a premium as peaking power to large utilities where thermal and nuclear plants suitably provide base load supply. Resource is worth more to NL this way. Install more generating capacity at the upper Churchill plant – develop the lower Churchill to handle higher discharge rates. Isolated grid stability requires spinning backup capacity for unscheduled downtime of large sources. We are better served by smaller generation facilities distributed strategically on the grid.





NOTES:

The most recent cost estimate for a HVDC power line from Labrador to the Avalon is over \$2 billion.

The grid would require a backup for this source as a disruption must be planned for.



The mortgage on the power line alone – not the construction of plant (\$10 billion++?) or purchase of the power – ***just the powerline*** would be \$10-\$20 million per month depending on interest rates.

If Newfoundland electricity customers have to pay for this powerline then we will all have an increase in our ***monthly*** bill of well over \$100 – for decades to come.



3 – On-Island Hydro Procurement:


Allow/promote non-utility generators to add mini, micro and small hydro capacity (say up to 25 MW) to the grid via new developments and retrofitting existing facilities. Stringent regulations should be enforced and competition promoted, general sales and permitting guidelines established. End the moratorium – it is not rational.





4 - Wind Power

NL should promote private wind power developments by fixing guidelines for energy sales to the distribution utilities. Wind power is best as a fossil fuel-offsetting energy supply when hydro storage is available. It is not effective as firm capacity nor does it contribute positively to grid stabilization. It is not a substitute for demand-ready capacity.





NOTES:

Wind Power in Newfoundland:

In 2004 September, NLHydro started purchasing power from Ramea wind – 6 x 65 kw turbines capable of providing 35% of capacity – estimates that 190,000 litres of diesel will be displaced annually.

In a February 2005 WIND backgrounder – NLHydro says Ramea wind provides 15-20% of energy needs of Ramea

In the NLHydro 2005 annual report : Ramea wind provided 418,000 kWh = 10% of energy requirement of Ramea or 107,000 litres of diesel


*This suggests a capacity factor for4 Ramea Wind of **12%***

Even if better efficiencies are realized The island system “can only accommodate up to approximately 80 MW of wind power without significant risk of spilling water at our existing hydroelectric stations” – NLHydro = 15% of thermal capacity.



5 - Nuclear power

Nuclear power is re-emerging as primary clean base-load energy supply for large interconnected grids. Present design strategies do not provide for small units, facilities are measured in the 1000's of megawatts. This single source (non-distributed) generation is poorly suited to an Insular grid the size of ours where hydro accounts for almost 100% of energy needs for part of the year.





6 - Natural Gas Fired Generation

Today, the CCG equivalent of 2600MW of power is produced in associated natural gas at Hibernia and White Rose - greater than the entire capacity of Island generation, greater than the prospective capacity of the lower Churchill, and the natural gas is much, much closer to us than Labrador.

Even if only 60% recoverable, the natural gas resources at Hibernia, Terra Nova and Whiterose can provide fuel to run a Holyrood-equivalent combined cycle plant at full capacity 365 days a year for over 100 years.



6 - Natural Gas Fired Generation Cont...

Converting Holyrood from Residual Fuel oil to Natural Gas would reduce Provincial CO₂ and SO₂ emissions by 480,000 tonnes per year (meeting the one-ton-challenge for every Newfoundlander – indefinitely)

Associated natural gas can be piped to NL at a significantly lower cost than a power line from Labrador and could arrive a decade earlier with all infrastructure paid for prior to the start up of a Lower Churchill river power plant, i.e., on the grid in a short enough time frame to be of use to Abitibi, INCO and other current industrial consumers.



New Electrical Capacity Options CONCLUSION:

Thermal power from fossil fuels will continue to play a major role (30%++) in meeting electrical energy needs on the Island of Newfoundland for many years to come. Options are (coal not considered):

- Foreign oil-fired generation
- Domestic oil-fired generation
- Foreign natural gas-fired generation (LNG import)
- Domestic natural gas-fired

It is my assertion that the best solution economically, technically environmentally and politically is domestic natural gas fired generation, 2nd place = LNG



Natural Gas Development Hurdles

Rules, regulations, taxation . . Framework needs to be in place, clear and enforceable to attract investment and encourage timely development.

Oil and gas operators need to be in competition with each other, they don't always work well together.

Operators have limited time horizon – long term planning strategy is often vague, giving way to shorter term shareholder demands. They do not like to interfere with profitable operations.

Perceived risks from icebergs, and harsh ocean environment



Development Hurdles Continued. . .

Labrador gas, tanker-based production/transport are distracting decision-makers, regulators, academics and the public from developing Grand Banks gas resources now.

Reinjection issues. Reinjection of gas is not essential for reservoir maintenance – and retrieval is not guaranteed (permanent losses may be anywhere between 10 and 50%).

Gas will ultimately be produced commercially on the Grand Banks but Newfoundland may be bypassed.



Natural Gas Development Criteria

- Market driven, not concept driven.
- Proven recoverable resource-based
- Lowest technological risk
- Lowest cost, highest present value and long term
- Highest benefit to NL

Equals a pipeline now. . .




CONCEPT AVALON PIPELINE OVERVIEW:

- Specifications for meeting domestic energy needs
- How to Install
- How to Repair
- How to Maintain
- Cost of this Pipeline
- Examples of Similar Pipelines




Small Scale Avalon Pipeline Concept:

- 12" diameter pipeline
- 350km
- 1/2" wall thickness
- 3000psi inlet pressure
- 90 mmscf/d (= 600MW new Siemens CCG)



Pulled through existing J-Tube at Hibernia, trenched, bermed, reeled or laid, coated, anodes, labour, engineering, contingencies etc etc





Pipe Lay Method

SEMISUBMERSIBLE PIPELAY VESSEL

DP PIPELAY VESSEL





Pipe-Reel Method






Pipeline Assembly Onboard Pipelay Vessel





Pipeline Installation Stinger





Pipeline Prep Yard (if required)

Shaw & Shaw
pipecoating
facility at Sheet
Harbour, Nova
Scotia





EXTERNAL INSPECTION:

Via Remotely Operated
Vehicle (ROV)



INTERNAL INSPECTION:

Via Intelligent pigging





Pipeline Cleaning:

Cleaning pig train
including the use of bi-
directional pigs and
solvent swab






Pipeline Repair Protocol

- 1 Leak detection and compressor shut down**
- 2 Damage location**
- 3 Excavate pipe**
- 4 Remove concrete**
- 5 Cold-cut pipe ends**
- 6 Insert pipeline plugs**
- 7 Deploy hyperbaric chamber**
- 8 Perform hyperbaric repair welding**
- 9 Repair coating**
- 10 Recommission pipeline**




REPAIR OF A DAMAGED SECTION OF PIPELINE AT 250 m WATER DEPTH USING A HYPERBARIC WELDING SYSTEM FROM A DP- DSV

(From: Wilson, German, Bruneau, 1999)






Once the pipeline pressure has been controlled a DP-DSV would mobilise to site






SETTING OF THE PIPE HANDLING FRAMES






Typical “goal-post” pipe lifting frames






DIVERS RAISE THE PIPELINE SECTION OFF SEABED USING COMBINATION OF LIFTING FRAME AND AIR LIFTING BAGS






Divers cut out the damaged section of pipe






PREPARING THE PIPE FOR PLACEMENT OF HABITAT






DSV PLACES THE HABITAT






Typical principal dimensions of a Hyperbaric Welding Habitat






The sealing of the pipeline inside the habitat






Setting the habitat ready for work (pumping dry)






Once the habitat is set the divers set the seals, pump dry and then commence the hyperbaric weld






The hyperbaric weld






Once the pipeline has been repaired the DP-DSV would recover the hyperbaric spread





Once the pipeline has been repaired the DP-DSV would place a protection frame or concrete mats







OTHER PIPELINES



Major North Sea Pipelines

SAME SCALE



North Sea UK sector Minor Pipelines

SAME SCALE






SOEP – Sable Pipeline

Sable Gas Pipeline

- 225 km 26 inch pipeline
- 100+ km 18 inch, 12 inch
- \$250 million CAD
- 23 months to complete
- Throughput up to 500 mmscfd




Approx \$200-250 million USD to build subsea pipelines in 1999



Eastern Caribbean Pipeline Project

- 900-kilometre pipeline between 5 islands
- Maximum water depth 2000m
- Routing minimizes earthquake problems, hurricane wave problems, coral reefs sensitivities, volcanoes, fishery
- 12 inches, 10 inches, 8 inches
- Delivery of 150 mmscf/d
- Cost \$550 million USD
- Commercially viable according to producers and contractors but not yet built due to political environment

Source: Doris Inc. Technical and Economic Feasibility of the Eastern Caribbean Gas Pipeline 2002





Vancouver Island Pipeline 1991

Westcoast Energy, Centra,
Terasen

- 550-kilometre pipeline
- Mountainous terrain and along the ocean floor
- One of the world's deepest underwater pipelines 400m+
- Twin 10 inch subsea section
- \$355 million CAD
- Delivers over 100 mmscf/d
- Population of Vancouver Island is 690,000



Source: Centra Gas (B.C.)

Natural Gas and its Impacts on Greenfield Areas

Submitted to Atlantic Canada Petroleum Institute

By Gardner Pinfold Consulting Economists Limited September 2002



Pipeline Costs



Pipeline Cost Details

Source : Private communic J.P.Kenny, EXXONmobil Corp., Others (2005)

Construction

Survey 1
Survey 2
Pipelay
DSV
Trench
Shore Approach
Platform Pull In
Pre-Commisioning

Engineering

Concept Engineering
FEED
Detail Engineering
Regulatory Process
Environmental Effort

Management

PMT
Owners Costs

Procurement

Line Pipe
Line Pipe Delivery
Anodes
External Coating
Internal Coating

Input Data

Pipe Length	330 Km
Pipe Outer Diameter	14 inch
Pipe Wall Thickness	0.486 inch
Pipelay Rate	4.1 km/day
Trenching Rate	2 km/day
% Route Trenched	100 %

U.S. Dollars 203,191

Contingency 20 % (includes Ins., duties & contingency) 40,638

Total Project Cost, million U.S. dollars **243.829**




Pipeline Cost Details

Source : Private communic J.P.Kenny, EXXONmobil Corp., Others (2005)


Input Data

Pipe Length	330 Km
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Pipe Wall Thickness	0.486 inch
Pipelay Rate	4.1 km/day
Trenching Rate	2 km/day
% Route Trenched	100 %

Capital Cost v Diameter




Flow v Diameter





Iceberg Grounding Risk Map


(Bruneau et al, 1999)
North Atlantic Pipeline
Partners





Route Assessment

(Bruneau et al,
1999) North Atlantic
Pipeline Partners





Last note on pipeline costs

Iceberg Scour Risk to pipeline...


- NOIA study declared the problem “manageable”
- White Rose field pipeline analysis indicates low risk
- Proposed Avalon pipeline to be trenched
- In worst case normal repair protocols, times, costs applicable
- A lot safer than the alternative tanker traffic carrying crude.



Natural Gas Resource Availability




Availability of Gas Resources for On-Island Use






Proximity of Grand Banks Gas





Availability of Gas Resources for On-Island Use





Availability of Gas Resources for On-Island use

The average daily production of natural gas

- Hibernia in 2005 = 273 mmscf/d
- Terra Nova in 2005 = 106 mmscf/d
- White Rose in 2006 = 53 mmscf/d
- Therefore It can be safely assumed that:

The average daily production of associated natural gas in 2006 and beyond will be in excess of 400 mmscf/d

- Total gas consumed on these platforms for electrical power is around 15 or 20 mmscf/d
- The amount of gas required to enhance oil recovery is not common public knowledge – it appears that 100% at Terra Nova, 50% at Hibernia and 0% at White Rose are reasonable guesses, ie. 250mmscf/d leaving **150+ available**.
- The amount of gas that has been assumed (for the Avalon Pipeline economics) to supply our electrical energy needs in 2010 is **80 mmscf/d**
- The amount of gas that is produced now but reinjected and **lost permanently** may be over **100 mmscf/d** (CNOPB assumed 70% salvageable at W.R.)




Producer's Costs and Oil Production Risks



Producers Costs and Oil Production Risks


Not known clearly, but indicators exist

In approving the White Rose Development the CNLOPB reports that Maersk and Husky studied the refit question in 2001 and found that the most likely scenario was a refit cost of \$75 million CAD with 12 weeks downtime – in order to facilitate a 150 mmscfd export pipeline (approximately double Island requirements). This figure would, in all likelihood, move downwards as detailed engineering and operational optimization of scheduled maintenance were performed.



Petrobras P-36 Wind Tunnel Tests

University of Western Ontario 1990
S. Bruneau, S. Ramsay, A. Davenport





Petrobras P-36
Fatal Disaster and sinking
a few years ago.





Owners Costs and Oil Production Risks

It is also probable that the modification costs and downtime associated with a domestic export line launched from Hibernia would be lower than this, and, that accommodation for same could be made on the yet-to-be-designed Hebron platform

Regardless, it appears that the likely maximum cost to the producer approaches \$200 million USD if downtime oil is considered “lost”.



Economic Case Study for Avalon Pipeline



Sample Gas Dev Economic Case Study:

CAPEX and OPEX conservatively estimated as follows:

All in millions of USD

- Platform preps = 200, Operating = 5
- Offshore Pipeline = 300, Operating = 10
- On-Shore Pipeline = 12.5, Operating = 2
- Power generation = 400, Operating = 15 + Fuel



Where is this leading?

The economic model assumptions:

Maximum platform modification and lost oil costs	\$200 million USD
Daily average throughput in 2010 dropped to	80 mmscf/d
Pipeline costs left (high) at	\$300 million USD
Producers netback at platform left at	\$2.0 USD/mscfd
Power plant costs left at 0.8 USD per Watt (turnkey)	\$400 million USD
Infrastructure rate of return on equity pre tax	10%
All OPEX costs remain intact as presented for 22 year life of project	

RESULT:

<i>Cost of electricity at the Holyrood gate</i>	<i>6 cents US / KWh</i>
--	--------------------------------

Though this model is simplistic and may be considered indicative only – it does indicate that the economics are realistic and compelling when compared to the costs of the alternatives, in particular, foreign crude.



Upside

- Proven operation of gas pipeline will quickly promote looping for enhanced deliveries for other end uses including on-Island LNG production. Looping provides additional supply security, and opens up other marginal developments on the Grand Banks.
- When gas throughput volumes increase, the IRR for the platform and the onshore infrastructure climbs providing flexibility for improved netback to producers and better electricity prices for consumers.



Supply Reliability and Storage Requirements



Energy Storage and Supply Security for natural gas-fired electricity on the Island of Newfoundland:

Options include:

- Standby oil-fired facilities or dual-fuel capabilities
- Standby distillate tank for combined cycle gas plant
- LNG peak shaving plant
- Third party storage facilities for backup fuel supply, such as
 - the proposed LNG trans-shipment,
 - NARL inventories
 - New Refinery

Preferred solution not known but lets look at an example:





Supply storage example



Recall the Vancouver Island Pipeline . . .

In 2004 the following application was made:



LNG STORAGE PROJECT

IN THE MATTER OF the Utilities Commission Act,
R.S.B.C. 1966, Chapter 473 (the "Act")


AND IN THE MATTER OF an Application by
Terasen Gas (Vancouver Island) Inc. for a
Certificate of Public Convenience and Necessity
Pursuant to Section 45 of the Act

Submitted to the
British Columbia Utilities Commission

August 2004



Conceptual Single containment storage tank with secondary containment earthen dike



Source: Centra Gas (B.C.)



Supply storage example



The LNG Storage Plan was devised to secure supply and meet increased Island peak demands without building a new supply pipeline

Figure 14.1 LNG Facility Capital Costs (2004\$millions)

EPC Costs	73.8
Owners Costs	
Land	1.6
Interconnecting Facilities	9.3
Project Services	7.9
Contingency	1.8
Total	94.4

Figure 14.2 LNG Facility Operating Costs (2004\$000)

Fixed Operating	\$ 930
Variable Operating (excl gas)	\$ 557
Total	\$1,487

Figure 9.1 Primary Codes and Regulations

Code	Edition	Description
B.C. Pipeline Act and Pipeline Regulation	2002	Regulation of the Design, Construction and Operation of Pipeline Facilities
CSA Z 276	2001	LNG Production, Storage, and Handling
CSA 682	2003	Oil and Gas Pipeline Systems
NBC	1995 & Revisions	National Building Code of Canada
C.E.C.	2002	Canadian Electrical Code Part 1, 19 th Edition
API 620 App. Q	10th	Design and Construction of Large, Welded, Low Pressure Storage Tanks
CSA B51	1997	Boiler, Pressure Vessel, and Pressure Piping Code
CAN/CSA A23.3-94 (2000)	2000	Design of Concrete Structures
Terasen Standards	As Applicable	Standards for Equipment, Materials, Construction Procedures, Inspection, Testing, Security and Safety

The powerline will be designed and constructed to BC Hydro Engineering and Construction Standards. The design and construction of the electrical substation will conform to the Canadian Electrical Code CSA 22.1

Terasen (owner) says:

- 30 months from start to finish
- Very robust, safe, economical
- Will liquify gas during low demand and regasify during high demand
- All codes and regs are in place
- Project has been approved by BC regulators



LNG Elsewhere in N. America

Peak shaving LNG storage located at strategic points along gas pipelines are increasingly in use to provide additional grid storage. There are approx. 50 such facilities in the US.

The production, storage, truck transport and regasification of LNG is also well established in Canada

Currently three LNG plants operating in Canada - Tillbury Island (BC Gas), Hagar LNG plant (Union Gas), Montreal (Gaz Met.)

Pine Needle Peak Shaving Facility, North Carolina

- 4 billion scf storage, 400 mmscfd regasification, 20 mmscfd liquifaction

- Total cost 107 Million USD



Tilbury LNG Plant (1971)

0.60 bcf storage, 200 mmscfd regas.



Hagar LNG Plant (1969)

0.61 bcf storage, 90 mmscfd regas.



Montreal LNG Plant (1970)

2.0 bcf storage, 280 mmscfd regas.






On-Island market size and seasonal variability



On Island Market and Seasonal Variability

Absolute minimum gas demand would be Holyrood conversion **only** with low-level demand growth forecast as follows:





On Island Market and Seasonal Variability

Other potential conversion customers in the future may include:


Legend

Potential Gas Customer




Facilities considered

- 1 - Holyrood Power Generating Station
- 2 - Memorial University Steam Plant
- 3 - St Claire's Hospital
- 4 - Labatt Brewery
- 5 - Molson Brewery
- 6 - Miller Center
- 7 - Pleasantville Steam Plant
- 8 - Metrobus
- 9 - Come By Chance Oil Refinery





On Island Market and Seasonal Variability



Opportunity here for combined cycle generation on campus with waste heat used for MUN





On Island Market and Seasonal Variability

On Island Demand Profile

Other minor conversions possible*

- Heavy Fuel Oil to Natural Gas
- May be supplied by trucking LNG or by pipeline

*** Does not include demand growth opportunities from INCO, refineries, pulp and paper other



Figures are circa 2000-2001 Provided by indicated source



Summary of Gas Development Concept

- Resource base is easily in place today for Island requirements - major export pipeline gas quantities are not yet proven.
- Proposal uses gas from existing oil developments, and existing pipeline technology.
- Eliminates gas reinjection wastage and realizes higher present value of salvaged gas.
- Initially, gas remains stranded in Province for use/processing unlike a large grid-connecting pipeline with “postage stamp” tariff structure, i.e., the price of stranded gas would be lower than the grid price.
- Provides for huge environmental benefit at negative cost



CONCLUSION

Associated gas transferred to the Island via pipeline is economical and is a wise choice for Newfoundland and Labrador energy strategy. It will result in lower electricity prices, improved environmental stewardship, will attract major industry including LNG export opportunities, and, is economical to begin IMMEDIATELY.




What can be done to advance this concept

Go and get unbiased, objective opinions from experts but we **MUST**

Ask the right questions!

- “Do we have the right to access this resource right now given the current rate of reinjection losses and our current domestic energy needs”?
- “If there is no royalty regime in place for gas then who owns the resource if it is an unused byproduct with zero book value to producers”?
- “What are the producers actual refit costs for a small export line”?
- “Can the unused natural gas resources available 300 km offshore be competitive with alternate foreign supply sources for Newfoundland”?



Lets ask these questions and see what we get. . .



END OF PRESENTATION

Many thanks for your attention on this and I look forward to your questions



**Steve Bruneau
Memorial University of Newfoundland
Faculty of Engineering and Applied Science**



So, why isn't it done? . . . Because prior conditions were adverse:

1. Simplicity of oil-only developments was more attractive, less risky, for investment in this environmentally challenging region considered “frontier” for oil and “immature” for gas.
2. Gas resources were deemed insufficient to warrant producer-owned infrastructure linking Grand Banks to continental markets.
3. Early development options for gas pipelines were third-party initiatives that were viewed as meddling in the affairs of producers who were putting up the cash for the oil developments, and, threatened downstream control of resource flow and future profit taking.
4. Prior gas initiatives were based on the presumption that political and regulatory will could be captured. However, Governments were unwilling to risk scuttling oil developments or oil royalty talks on the technical and economic risks that producers stated would result from incorporating gas play. In addition, the regulator was too inexperienced or without the mandate to object.

So Why Now? What has changed?

1. NFLD Oil industry is maturing. Producers have conquered the risks of operating offshore Newfoundland through demonstrating fantastic profitability, safety and security through existing oil developments.
2. On the Island we can capture new power investments on a go-forward basis because very few new electric energy projects are on the books or committed to and policy review is ongoing
3. Acting now will reduce electrical price uncertainty from crude and improve availability to existing and new customers such as Abitibi, INCO, new refineries, etc
4. Acting now will give us access to our offshore gas resources prior to it becoming available to others at a higher price, ie, we must secure a recall quantity of the resource that satisfies domestic thermal needs before its value escalates to North American market prices

So Why Now? What has changed?

New conditions Continued . .

- Commodity prices are very high now, relief may be in sight but vulnerability and uncertainty prevail. True cost of our oil dependency will be felt as our crude inventories are re-supplied and rate stabilization takes place through the PUB.
- The permanent loss of associated gas produced offshore occurs daily – and the losses are greater than our total requirements if we replaced oil at Holyrood with Grand Banks gas. Emissions would be curtailed by ½ million tons per annum immediately.